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George P. Smith, II, Genetics, Ethics, and the Law. Tarrytown, N.Y.:
Associated Faculty Press, 1981. Pp. 241. $28.50, cloth; $18.50, paper.
Reviewed by Larry I. Palmer

George P. Smith's explicit thesis in this small monograph on a large topic
is built upon several propositions, or suppositions, about the proper
relationship of law to science. Some scientific evidence indicates that our
genetic endowment affects human health as well as behavior; genetic
researchers have made great strides in developing techniques for genetic
manipulation of several biological organisms; genetic engineering (as these
techniques are called), if and when applied to the human species, presents
the opportunity for positive and negative eugenics; and as these possibilities
for negative and positive eugenics emerge, society must weigh its traditional
notions of the sanctity of human life against the possibility of an improved
quality of life (p. 2).
Smith's implicit thesis is that law shouid not inhibit the development of
human genetic manipulation. Throughout the book he uses terms that
indicate he has adopted a normative position on topics. For instance, in his
opening paragraph he takes the position that a percentage of children are
born with "genetic deficiencies" (p. 1). From a scientific point of view, there
is no such thing as a genetic deficiency, even though human beings may
desire to avoid certain characteristics. Moreover, the organization of the book
can be understood only if one assumes that Smith has adopted a normative
position on law.
Each of the book's nine chapters is relatively short, ranging from ten to
twenty pages, plus footnotes. Smith may have intended to write essays, but
each chapter unfortunately is written in the style of a short law-review
article, with footnotes taking more space than text. For example, Chapter 8,
dealing with the potentially provocative topic of the interaction of science
and ethics, has three pages of text and five pages of footnotes. The footnotes
dominate the chapters, making the book difficult to read.
Smith adopts other methods of traditional legal scholarship that limit the
utility of the book. The book is not about genetics as an important aspect of
the biological sciences but in fact about the manipulation of genes, what he
calls genetic engineering. As a result it is fair to say the book concentrates on
the implication of certain techniques or procedures without much attention
to an appreciation of the substance of the underlying science. Smith's
implicit thesis is thus built upon the lawyer's technique of assuming factsi.e., that human gene manipulation will be possible soon-and then writing
short essays based on that one assumption. The reader is thus given little
insight into the dynamics of the science of human genetics.
In order to deal seriously with "genetic engineering," the reader must be
apprised of the interplay between basic research in genetics and engineering
innovations. This interplay is particularly important in human genetics,
which is significantly more complex than animal genetics. The techniques
now available for screening for certain genetic diseases, such as amniaLarry I. Palmer is Vice-Provost and Professor of Law, Cornell University.

Book Reviews

557

centesis, may be used in genetic engineering programs, but there are
significant social and economic issues that must be faced before the legal
issues become important. At present, the major issue that amniocentesis
presents is how to keep the use of the technique "medically relevant." .
Smith's discussion of an evolving notion of "genetic health" fails to
present the social issues and the potential legal issues associated with
knowledge of genetics in their appropriate social context. For instance he
thinks that the well-known Massachusetts case on withholding treatment for
mentally retarded persons, Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz (373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 [Mass. 1977]), stands for the broad proposition that
"quality of life" is a legally appropriate standard in dealing with a
"genetically defective individual," in this case, a retarded sixty-three-yearold man. He does not point out that the Saikewicz court went to great pains
to avoid a "quality of life" judgment. Furthermore, other courts have
explicitly rejected a quality-of-life type of analysis in dealing with mentally
retarded individuals. (See, e.g. Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64
[N.Y. 1981].) Smith's presentation is more of a brief for one particular view
than a thoughtful analysis of problems dealing with mentally retarded
individuals.
The discussion would be more helpful if it dealt with a problem associated
with human genetics that has positive and negative factors of equal weight.
Issues that arise in the neonatal nursery, for example, are more provocative
and analytically more significant than those in Saikewicz. On the positive
side in the neonatal nursery setting, medical officials are dealing with
parents whose hopes for the future are symbolized by the newborn. On the
negative side, the doctors must also decide whether to use the available
medical technologies or to use the at-risk newborn for the purposes of
research or experimental treatment. For lawyers there are two significant
aspects of dealing with the neonatal nursery. First, there have been very few
"legal cases" dealing with decision making within the neonatal nursery and
only recent attempts to regulate. Second, the neonatal nursery is a setting
where genetic therapy is likely to take place. Whether these attempted
therapies constitute genetic engineering is open to debate. A mentally
retarded sixty-three-year-old man with cancer, as presented in Saikewicz,
presents a host of other important issues but in itself suggests little to do
with genetic engineering.
On the whole, I do not recommend this book to law teachers interested in
law and science or in law and medicine. The author presented a highly
emotional subject matter without an analytical framework. Since he does not
face up to the uncertainties within the science of genetics, he is unable to
consider that there may be a corresponding uncertainty in law as it
encounters genetic issues. The revolution in biological techniques does
present challenges for law, but these important scientific endeavors are
entitled to a more creative approach than Smith has provided.

